Several authors have observed that Prisoners' Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem are related-for instance, in that both involve controversial appeals to dominance., But to call them "related" is an understatement. Considered as puzzles about rationality, or disagreements between two conceptions thereof, they are one and the same problem. Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem-or rather, two Newcomb Problems side by side, one per prisoner. Only the inessential trappings are different. Let us make them the same.
to be served consecutively; escape from the long sentence costs a million, and escape from the short sentence costs a thousand. But it is irrelevant how the prisoners propose to spend their money.) So the payoff matrix looks like this. Newcomb's Problem is the same as regards points (i) and (2). The only difference-if such it be-is that point (3) is replaced by (3') I will get my million if and only if it is predicted that I do not take my thousand.
"Predicted" need not mean "predicted in advance." Not so in English: we credit new theories with success in "predicting" phenomena already observed. And not so in Newcomb's Problem. While it dramatizes the problem to think of the million already there, or else already not there, in the opaque box in front of me as I deliberate, it is agreed all around that what really matters is (2), and hence that the "prediction" should be causally independent of my decision. Making the prediction ahead of time is one good way to secure this causal independence. But it is not the only way.2 Provided that I can have no effect on it, the prediction could just as well be made simultaneously with my decision or even afterwards, and the character of Newcomb's Problem would be unchanged.3 Likewise in the case of Prisoners' Dilemma nothing need be assumed-and in my telling of the story, nothing was assumed-about whether the prisoners are put to the test simultaneously or one after the other.
Also it is inessential to Newcomb's Problem that any predictionin advance, or otherwise-should actually take place. It is enough that some potentially predictive process should go on, and that wheth- Also, some replicas are more reliable than others. There may be grounds for greater or lesser degrees of confidence that my replica and I will decide alike in the matter of the thousand. A replica that matches me perfectly in the respects relevant to my decision (whether duplicate or isomorph) will have more predictive power than a less perfect replica; but even a poor replica may have some significant degree of predictive power. As Newcomb's Problem is usually told, the predictive process involved is extremely reliable. But that is inessential. The disagreement between conceptions of rationality that gives the problem its interest arises even when the reliability of the process, as estimated by the agent, is quite poor-indeed, even when the agent judges that the predictive process will do little better than chance. More precisely, define average estimated reliability as the average of (A) the agent's conditional degree of belief that the predictive process will predict correctly, given that he takes his thousand, and (B) his conditional degree of belief that the process will predict correctly, given that he does not take his thousand. (When the predictive process is a simulation, for instance, we have the average of two conditional degrees of belief that the agent and his replica will decide alike.) Let r be the ratio of the value of the thousand to the value of the million: ooi 5. On the other hand, you might be an extremely perfect and reliable replica, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma between twins described by Nozick, "Newcomb's Problem," pp. I30-I3I. 6. If you do not meet even the low standard of estimated reliability just considered, either because you are unlike me or because you and I alike are apt to choose at random or because the payoffs are such as to set r rather high, then we have a situation with no clash between conceptions of rationality; on any conception, it is rational to rat. But even this non-problem might legitimately be called a version of Newcomb's Problem, since it satisfies conditions (i), (2), and (3").
think it is rational not to rat if the two partners are enough alike.7 Their reason is that they believe, justifiably, that those who do not rat will probably not be ratted on by their like-thinking partners. These two opinions are one opinion in two guises.
But some-I, for one-who discuss Newcomb's Problem think it is rational to take the thousand no matter how reliable the predictive process may be. Our reason is that one thereby gets a thousand more than he would if he declined, since he would get his million or not regardless of whether he took his thousand. And some-I, for onewho discuss Prisoners' Dilemma think it is rational to rat no matter how much alike the two partners may be, and no matter how certain they may be that they will decide alike. Our reason is that one is better off if he rats than he would be if he didn't, since he would be ratted on or not regardless of whether he ratted. These two opinions also are one.
Some have fended off the lessons of Newcomb's Problem by saying: "Let us not have, or let us not rely on, any intuitions about what is rational in goofball cases so unlike the decision problems of real life." But Prisoners' Dilemmas are deplorably common in real life. They are the most down-to-earth versions of Newcomb's Problem now available.
7. For instance Davis, "Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality." He considers the case in Which the partners are alike because they are both rational; but there is also the case where they are alike because they are given to the same sorts of irrationality.
